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This research elaborates the role of political culture on the rising power of extreme right 
parties from 20 European countries between the time period of 2002 and 2012. Previous 
studies in the literature focuses on the effects of economic and political conditions to 
explain increasing vote share of extreme right parties. This thesis aims to introduce 
cultural explanations to provide an additional focus on value orientations of people and 
social cleavages behind their voting behavior. 
With the above mentioned aim, this thesis tests the effects of political culture with the 
cross-national survey data from European countries to analyze the rise on extreme right 
voting. First, the effect of previously studied contextual characteristics and socio-
political attitudes are introduced. Further, to measure political culture, different values 
such as; religiosity, political and social trust, tolerance, civic engagement, obedience 
and national pride are tested. As findings show; intolerance to immigrants and ethnic 
minorities is an important indicator for extreme right voting and religiosity, civic 
engagement or activism and political distrust have a positive impact on increasing votes 
of ERPs in Europe. 
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AVRUPA’DA AŞIRI SAĞ PARTİLERİN YÜKSELEN GÜCÜ: SİYASAL 
KÜLTÜRÜN ETKİSİ 
Zülal Sunaçoğlu 
Siyaset Bilimi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014. 
Tez Danışmanı: Özge Kemahlıoğlu 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasal kültür, oy verme davranışları, aşırı sağ partiler, Avrupa 
Bu çalışma, 2002 ile 2012 yılları arasında 20 Avrupa ülkesi için siyasal kültürün aşırı 
sağ partilerin yükselen gücüne olan etkisini araştırmaktadır. Literatürde mevcut 
çalışmalar yükselen aşırı sağ parti oy oranlarının ekonomik ve siyasal koşullar sebepli 
oluşan etkilerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu araştırma sosyal ayrılmaların ve değer 
yargılarının Avrupa ülkelerindeki oy verme eğilimlerine olan etkilerine ek olarak 
odaklanmayı amaçlamaktadır. 
Yukarıda bahsedilen amaçlara bağlı olarak, bu tez siyasal kültürün olası etkilerini 
birden fazla Avrupa ülkesini karşılaştırma imkanı sağlayan bir veritabanı kullanarak test 
etmektedir. Öncelikli olarak, literatürde çalışılmış olan içeriksel özellikler ve sosyo-
politik davranışlar çalışmaya eklenmiştir. Buna ek olarak siyasal kültürü hesaplanabilir 
hale getirmek için dindarlık, sosyal ve politik güven, tolerans, sivil katılım, itaat ve 
ulusal gurur gibi farklı değerlerin etkileri test edilmiştir. Bunun sonucunda etnik kökeni 
farklı olan vatandaşlara ve göçmenlere karşı olan hoşgörüsüzlüğün aşırı sağ parti oy 
verme eğiliminde önemli bir belirleyici olduğu ve dindar, sivil katılımı ve aktifliğin ve 
politik güvensizliğin Avrupa’daki aşırı sağ partilerin yükselen oylarında etkili olduğu 
ortaya çıkmıştır. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
Increasing vote share of extreme right wing parties is popularly debated among 
Europeans in the last decade, as it further ignited concerns over the increasing power of 
extreme right ideology. As a consequence, the number of academic studies on this 
subject has increased. While existing studies widely focus on the economic and political 
conditions of countries to explain increasing vote share of extreme right parties (ERPs), 
cultural explanations provide an additional focus on value orientations of people behind 
their voting behavior. It should here be noted that socio-political identities of 
individuals shape their political preferences while different sets of values shape these 
identities. This research contributes to the literature by testing effects of political culture 
among European countries, details of which will be elaborated in the fourth chapter. 
Furthermore, this study includes all European countries in its analysis and does not 
solely focus on Western European countries.  
Political attitudes and democratic tendencies have been linked to political culture 
with Almond and Verba’s (1963) famous concept of civic culture. Adopting the current 
arguments in existing literature, this research aims to define political culture with a 
broader sense as practiced political behavior and mindsets of people in political events. 
The mindset or psychology of voters is highly affected by their social and political 
identities. Most psychological research on political culture with approaches such as 
‘value’ orientation highlight the importance of socio-political identities of individuals 
and prefer an observation method such as surveys. In this context, what is commonly 
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known as the post-materialist values, which Inglehart’s (1997) highlights role of these 
values in shaping political preferences of individuals in the late modernization phase of 
industrial societies. 
Voting blocs are clustered around historical cleavages and these cleavages are 
expected to reflect deep and persistent values of the people. Social cleavages are 
commonly accepted determinants of voting behavior as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) point 
out in their famous work focusing on the social cleavage theory.  In this manner, it 
becomes significant to test social cleavages, specifically the parameters, which are 
assumed to shape socio-political identities and are expected to help researchers 
understand the tendencies of an individual in voting for extreme right parties. The 
parameters I examine in this thesis are as follows: religiosity, trust, tolerance, civic 
engagement, obedience and national pride. As a matter of fact, the results of this study 
will give an idea about the identity of societies which answers the question of why 
extreme right party (ERP) votes increase in European countries. Socio-political attitudes 
of European citizens have been discussed in this study to test what kind of values are 
effective in increasing votes of EPRs with an aim to further see whether there are 
possible emerging voting blocs (cleavages) or not.  
Traditional values such as nationalism and religion also continue their role in 
creating social cleavages by supporting new anti-immigrant discourse and by dividing 
societies into two: us and others. On the one hand, traditional roles of religion or 
nationalism do not continue determining the social division, because their meanings and 
practices changed over the time. On the other hand, these traditional values further 
deepen new cleavages that are established. At this point, political culture and values 
define identities of public, which might be creating or supporting the mentioned new 
cleavages or voting blocs. As mentioned above and as a consequence, this research is 
conducted to explain political tendencies or voting preferences of European citizens 
through their political culture patterns. 
In their work Werts et al. (2013) focus on social cleavages, role of religiosity, 
Euroscepticism and political distrust with their possible effect on extreme right voting. 
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They test socio-political attitudes, contextual variables and social background 
characteristics. This thesis aims to contribute their findings in a way that it broadens the 
social cleavage focus and add further test on value orientations to introduce political 
culture perspective to the literature. 
Here it should be noted that this thesis recognizes the conceptual ambiguity of 
political culture and its limits. However, it ambitiously focuses on finding an efficient 
way of operationalizing the concept in order to present the cultural reasons behind 
increasing voting for the extreme right. In the first chapter, my research question as well 
as its place in electoral studies will be presented. Then, the political culture and voting 
behavior literature will be examined in detail to demonstrate the theoretical and 
motivational background behind the research aims of this study. In the third chapter, the 
research design of this thesis is explained and the data, as the quantitative aspect of this 
study are introduced. After covering the motivation of this study along with its 
theoretical foundation and the research design, I elaborate on the analysis and its results 
in the fourth chapter. Finally, concluding remarks on the study’s implications are 
introduced in the fifth chapter with an additional discussion on the study’s strengths and 
pitfalls. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAME 
Extreme right parties (ERPs) started to emerge and gain electoral support in 
Western European countries in the last 30 years. This has been accompanied with an 
effort to add new empirical findings to the extreme right voting literature. Some have 
explained the success of ERPs; some explained unstable voting behavior among 
different countries of Western Europe whereas others focused on the question of why in 
some countries ERPs increased its popular support but not in others. Many scholars 
focused on the effects of unemployment and electoral institutions (Jackman&Volpert, 
1996; Lewis-Beck&Mitchell, 1993; Knigge, 1998; Golder, 2003; Swank&Betz, 2003) 
and immigration (Anderson, 1996; Martin, 1996; Knigge, 1998; Golder, 2003), the role 
of media (Boomgarden, and Vliengenthart, 2007; Van der Pas et al., 2013), social 
background (Lubbers et al. 2002, Werts et al. 2013), as well as the role of 
Euroscepticism (Werts et al. 2013). Furthermore differences in electoral successes 
among countries are also examined (Eatwell, 2003; Golder, 2003; Van der Brug et al., 
2005; Arzheimer, 2009; Art, 2011). 
Jackman and Volpert (1996) in their quantitative analysis show the 
unemployment effect in the success of extreme right parties. Furthermore effects of 
electoral threshold and multipartism within a proportional system on the success of ERP 
are tested. They test for 16 countries and 105 elections between 1970 and 1990. This 
research is significant since it is one of the earliest quantitative analyses of the success 
of ERPs. According to this research, higher unemployment and lower electoral 
threshold result in increasing electoral support for ERPs. 
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 Golder (2003) tests “the unemployment, immigration and electoral institutions 
effects on success of extreme right parties”. In his findings, he firstly distinguishes neo-
fascist parties and populist parties since they are affected by different factors. This 
division builds on the distinction between the two in the earlier literature (Ignazi, 1992, 
2003; Betz, 1994; Taggart, 1996). Then he tests the possible effects of the mentioned 
variables and concludes that unemployment only matters when immigration is high. 
Furthermore, populist parties gain more support where the district magnitude is large.  
Swank and Betz (2003) analyze the effect of welfare state institutions on ERP 
votes and asylum seekers number with its relation to the electoral success of ERP. As a 
result they find out that if number of asylum seekers is high ERP votes also increases 
whereas when welfare state is highly efficient then the electoral success of ERP is 
reduced.  
Arzheimer (2009) focuses on two basic aspects in his research; unstable support 
for ERP and weak support to ERP. Levels of unemployment and immigration are once 
again tested but this time with the inclusion of other possible variables. As a result 
institutions of the welfare state are found to moderate the effects of unemployment 
where immigration as well as other contextual and individual variables are included for 
testing the hypothesis. As Arzheimer (2009) highlights, it is important to conduct an 
explanatory research of why ERPs votes are increasing in certain countries but not in 
others. In doing so, the role of political culture is one of the suggestions he makes in his 
remarks on further research.   
The ERP literature mostly focuses on unemployment, immigration, but also 
examined the impact of many possible variables such as the role of globalization, 
Euroscepticism, social background characteristics, and the role of media. Many 
different possible explanations try to come up with a general pattern of who votes for 
the ERPs and why ERP votes increase in some countries. In this sense, it is significant 
to analyze the role of culture in this picture. Culture is an important tool to explain 
political or social events because it is a powerful factor that constructs and reconstructs 
ideas with its powerful roots. Culture is the source of identities of people and possible 
value identifications of individuals shape their way of life. Political behaviors of voters 
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are not always only shaped by unemployment, immigration rate, leadership, and media 
effects. Certain kinds of values and identities also lead to certain voting preferences. 
The effect of culture is inseparable from the previously examined factors in the ERP 
literature. Cultural values and value orientations define perspectives and perceptions of 
individuals which mean that effects of culture are always in the picture. Effects of 
globalization, Euroscepticism, leadership, or media shape voting behavior of people are 
significant but their effects are already defined by cultural orientations of individuals. 
At this stage it is important to see what kind of values identifications increase ERP vote 
share. 
2.1. Approaches to Voting Behavior 
2.1.1. Social- Psychological Approach 
Voters psychologically feel closer to certain parties and their attitudes are also 
shaped by party positions. Campbell (1960) has a psychological explanation for voting 
preferences as voters identify themselves with parties through the socialization process. 
In this manner, socialization process and social group identifications of people become 
crucial for voting preferences. The position of a party becomes an outline for certain set 
of behaviors of individuals who identify themselves with this party. 
According to the realistic conflict theory if there are scarce resources groups will 
compete for these sources and hostility will arise between them (Levine and Campbell, 
1972). In this realist perspective, rational behaviors of groups are used to explain 
reasons behind feelings of hostility. Same goals and motives for different groups create 
tensions and conflict between them. Coser (1956) explained social conflicts through the 
categories of realistic and non-realistic conflicts (Art 2011). Non-realistic conflicts are 
more emotionally motivated conflicts whereas realistic conflicts have more materialistic 
reasons and means.   
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Blumer (1958) focuses on social processes and group position in racial relations 
which resulted in prejudice against certain race groups.  There is hostility toward out 
groups that try to reach same goals (Coenders, 2001). Certain dominant groups form 
stereotypes and discrimination against other racial, ethnic groups. According to 
Coenders, Blumer and Coser's approaches comply with each other (Werts, 2010, p.22). 
They contribute to the literature with the argument that since each ethnic group in a 
society has a certain set of expectations, ideologies, and intentions over the scarce 
sources available to them; ethnic groups are more likely to have conflicting interests, so 
become adversaries in a society. As mentioned above, the reason behind the conflicting 
parties may be due to each group's understanding of power, social position, material 
resources or privileges that they have. 
Social identity theory elaborates psychological reasons behind in-group 
favoritism and out-group hostility (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Members of the same 
groups tend to act similarly; positively towards each other and negatively to others. 
Tajfel (1970) focuses on psychology of inter-group hostility and explains this hostility 
through categorization of people. Some people are more likely to discriminate against 
others and competition is not a sufficient explanation for this discrimination that leads 
to prejudice. Social identities of individuals matter for their behaviors and self-
categorization is the main reason for the creation of hostility.  
When individuals identify themselves with certain groups, they form positive 
attitudes towards in-group and discrimination and prejudice towards out-group (Tajfel, 
1970, p. 96).In this context, certain groups are more motivated to emphasize these 
negative feelings when competing with each other. In-group is generally characterized 
with national identification where out-groups are identified with immigrants, minorities 
or foreigners (Coenders, 2001). Extreme right parties position themselves with 
nationalistic tendencies and xenophobic, discriminative and negative stereotypes, as 
well as hostility feelings toward those who are categorized as others, be they 
immigrants, minorities and foreigners. Individuals who identify themselves with these 
ERPs are expected to be more intolerant and have lack of trust to outsiders or external 
groups.  
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Discrimination and hatred against outsiders are ways of expressing prejudice. 
These attitudes are formed by categorizations and psychology of individuals who 
identify themselves with certain social groups. Individual’s behaviors are shaped by the 
socialization process that forms social identities and shapes socio-political behaviors. 
Voting behavior is clustered around political groups that are created by these identity 
formations.   
 
2.1.2. Social Cleavage Theory and Extreme Right Voting 
Understanding the increase in votes of ERPs is only possible through understanding 
why people choose to vote for certain parties. According to the cleavage theory that 
Lipset&Rokkan (1967) introduces party politics in Europe are formulated around the 
traditional cleavages which divide the society and create voting blocs.  
People tend to identify themselves through certain values in which societal 
cleavages become the crucial shaping tools behind voting preferences. To understand 
the relation between the social cleavages and voting blocs, we should focus on how 
social cleavages determine political behavior. Social cleavages turn into political 
determinants when the alliances, coalitions evolve through party politics 
(Lipset&Rokkan, 1967, pp.116-117). In terms of achieving political power parties 
politicize social divisions to win votes. On the one hand, politics is defined through how 
people see themselves and how they request to be represented. In this manner major 
value divisions shape the voting blocs. On the other hand, parties try to build their 
alliances around existing cleavages and values which help them to fit party discourse to 
people who are closer and identify themselves with those parties due to their needs.  
Cleavage theory and its classical relational explanation of voting preferences 
underline the effects of political parties on political processes. Political parties also 
construct and “actively naturalize identities and collectivities and integrate them into 
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coherent blocs” (Tugal et al. 2009, p. 196). Voting blocs that are explained to be 
clustered around social cleavages are also affected by political parties influence. 
Although historical cleavages as well as political culture construct value orientations, 
socio-political identities and political preferences, these processes are dynamic and 
reciprocal. Contexts shape individuals and individuals shape contexts. 
Traditionally, party politics of Western European countries were formed around 
religious and class cleavages. Class based identification was visibly dominant during 
the Cold War Era. Right and left ideology has been the major determinant in the party 
politics and voting behavior literature since people chose to vote according to their 
ideologies.  However, as argued by Spies&Franzmann (2011), “Analyzing only the 
general left–right dimension is not sufficient for understanding what happens in 
contemporary party systems (p.1061).” With the victory of Western democracy and 
liberal market economy, ideology formulations and societal cleavages also changed. 
Kitschelt (1997, p.2) states that; “post-industrial politics is characterized by a main 
ideological cleavage dividing left-libertarians from right-authoritarians”. People no 
more polarize around the traditional left and right spectrum. Once religion based politics 
was the driving force of the European politics which turned into class based one with 
the Industrial Revolution (Lipset&Rokkan, 1967, p.101). In this dynamic process of 
cleavage formation new issues are also introduced in the process. New social divisions 
around immigration, ethnicity or maybe the old cleavage of religion might now affect 
voting behavior. New values might be determining voting choices of people and voting 
blocs. 
Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) in their ‘freezing hypothesis’ state that ‘1960s party 
systems’ are determined by ‘the cleavages of 1920s’ in Europe. According to this 
hypothesis, cleavages shape party systems and these systems create voting blocs. These 
party blocs are determined by value orientations that are shaping voting behaviors of 
people. In this thesis aim is to test these value orientations to see whether cleavages are 
frozen or not in the contemporary party system of Europe. In doing so, increasing 
extreme right voting is an important tool to determine these changing value orientations. 
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In the last decade, voting patterns have changed although the rise of the extreme 
right parties is not a new phenomenon in Europe. However, this time the reasons behind 
the increasing votes seem different. Ideas of right and left are very similar now that all 
mainstream parties follow similar policies. This creates new spaces for extreme parties 
to gain votes among Europe. For instance, in Germany the far left and in France 
extreme right parties gained votes. French Front National, Danish Progress Party, 
Austrian Freedom Party, Sweden Democrats, Belgium’s Vlaams Belang are major 
extreme right parties of Europe that increased their votes. Since different countries 
witnessed different political behaviors, possible political cultural differences and 
similarities between these countries are very important to be evaluated 
Extreme right discourse increasingly reached wider popular audience in last the 
30 years within Western European countries. The context of this discourse has been 
shaped by the extreme right wing parties through their simple messages. Commonly, far 
right parties are divided as neo-fascist parties and populist parties or the “new right” 
(Ignazi, 1992, 2003; Betz, 1994; Taggart, 1996) in the literature. Populist claims follow 
anti-immigrant discourses and tend to accuse immigrants of taking the job opportunities 
away from non-immigrant citizens. These claims tend to be successful since mainstream 
parties fail to satisfy voters in certain situations and extreme right discourse is able to 
fill the gap and gain the protest votes. As Ignazi (1992, 2003) points out, when 
mainstream parties fail to satisfy voters in terms of immigration and crime policies, 
voters turn to ERPs. Furthermore, extreme right discourse blames mainstream parties 
for being the same and attack central right and left parties, which let them gain votes 
from them. In this thesis rather than dividing ERPs, they are categorized under one 
extreme right wing category by following the categorization of Mudde (1999); if their 
party programs highlight values such as nationalism, xenophobia, and political 
dissatisfaction, focus of law and order, discomfort with existing parties.  
Extreme right movements are highly associated with nationalism and 
nationalistic attitudes towards foreigners within a country. Even though nationalism is a 
central issue for ERPs (Lubbers 2001), one should be aware that it goes far beyond the 
traditional nationalism understanding since it uses anti-establishment and anti-
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immigrant discourse (Ellianas, 2007, pp.355-356). Populist claims highlight that certain 
identities cannot be integrated into the national identity. This very idea makes ERPs 
extreme and exclusionary but at the same time attractive to citizens who have strong 
notions of belonging.  
There are more than economic reasons behind the increase of ERP voting. In 
certain countries ERPs do not increase their votes but in certain cases they do because 
the reason is not simply unemployment but more likely to be also related to cultural or 
societal divides that vary from country to country. In this sense, certain value 
orientations of voters from different European countries are likely to be determinants 
behind the increasing votes of ERPs. In the last decade, voting blocs are shifting and 
these shifts are affected by political culture. Different cultural orientations and identities 
of individuals shape voting preferences and social cleavages are reconstructed by this 
process. 
2.2. Approaches to Political Culture 
The study of political culture have been influenced by different disciplines; 
anthropology, sociology and mainly political psychology contributed to the field.  
Writings of Plato to Aristotle, Machiavelli to Marx influenced the political culture 
research through the history of political thought (Almond, 1980). 
1
 With the 1950s and 
1960s the concept started to be studied empirically in which conceptual ambiguity tried 
to be overcome by new methodologies and data and an effort to test the political 
behaviors (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1988, 1997; Eckstein, 1988, Putnam, 
1993).  
                                                 
1
Almond (1980) introduces the whole historical process of political culture and civic 
culture concept in his work. Political history, interdisciplinary influences and poltical 
theory with their relation to political culture are discussed.  
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Comparative politics literature has witnessed many debates about the difficulty of 
creating political culture concept. Modern political science has been trying to come up 
with a general pattern to explain why people act in certain ways in their political 
behaviors. Empirical research method has been used in operationalizing political culture 
with the help of psychological and cultural approaches (Almond and Verba, 1963; 
Inglehart, 1997; Eckstein, 1988, Pye, 1965). Mainly political psychology and survey 
data have been used to be able to measure political culture. The behavioralist approach 
focuses on attitudes and behaviors of individuals to come up with the generalizable idea 
of why and how people act in certain ways. The possibility of understanding the 
meanings of culture is very complex and impossible because psychology of individuals 
is very complex to be analyzed in their voting preferences. As a result, actions and 
behaviors of individuals become the concrete tools for us to understand and test how 
culture operates. 
The anthropological influence on the definition of culture also dominated 
cultural theory. Culture is learned through socialization process and anthropology 
focuses on its symbolic characteristics and tries to evaluate culture through these 
symbols. Values, ideas and beliefs are all cultural factors in which way of life of 
individuals are pursued and their lifestyles affect their actions. “Culture is not power but 
rather a context in which social events, behaviors, institutions and processes can be 
attributed” (Geertz, 1973, p. 14). Culture provides a framework for predictability of 
political behaviors of individuals and “their acts are signs” (Geertz, 1973, p. 13).This 
context gives meanings to behaviors of people and defines sociopolitical identities. 
There are many ‘culture’ definitions which makes it hard for political scientists to 
operationalize the political culture concept. Geertz definition of culture has widely 
influenced the political culture literature since defining and testing symbols as 
characteristics of a given culture allow empirical testing. 
With the 1980s political culture studies came under the dominance of rational 
choice theory similar to the whole political science field (Wildavsky, 1987; Inglehart, 
1988; Eckstein, 1988; Putnam, 1993). Political psychology and measuring behavior and 
preferences through survey analysis started to dominate. Rational explanations of 
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political behaviors and modern scientific methods became crucial for reasoning political 
actions. Political culture provides a framework for political behaviors, political identity 
and political tendency of a society to be analyzed. In their famous work The Civic 
Culture, Almond and Verba (1963) introduce the term civic culture and make survey 
data analysis among five countries to understand political attitudes and their relation to 
democracy. This empirical research soon became the foundation for political culture 
studies. 
Political culture helps us to understand why political behaviors differ among 
countries and why people choose to act in certain ways. The term political culture is 
defined as “political orientations- attitudes toward the political system and its various 
parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” by (Almond and Verba, 
1963; p.12).  Political orientations are shaped by culture and analyzing orientations of 
people is a way to understand cultures. Different cultures have different orientations and 
members of same cultures have similar political orientations (Eckstein 1988; 791).
2
 
Political preferences are shaped by the way people “construct their culture in the 
process of decision making and their continuing reinforcement, modification, and 
rejection of existing power relationships teaches them what to prefer” (Wildavsky, 
1987, p.5). When the political culture studies revived in 1980s the renaissance of 
political culture gave the field another phase. Inglehart (1988, 1990, 1997), highlighted 
the importance of civic culture with his emphasis on changing social, political and 
economic conditions of the world as well as changing values, which he called 
“postmaterialist values”.3  Inglehart (1997) expanded his political culture work and used 
World Values Survey (WVS) data sets to empirically support his research. 
Huntington’s (1996) clash of civilizations is also another important contribution 
to political culture literature in the political science field. Huntington focuses on the 
                                                 
2Eckstein introduces the term “orientational variability” and he states that orientations 
are variables that are not only subjective but they are more culturally formed or in other 
words “learned” (Eckstein 1988; 791). 
3
Post Materialist values refer to interpersonal trust, personal life satisfaction, political 
satisfaction (Inglehart 1988; p.1203). 
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divisions which are cultural and come from primordial identities according to his theory 
and there are civilizations in the world that explain major camps in the world. Cultural 
focus on understanding sources of conflict highlights cultural identity’s role in shaping 
actions.  Identities are shaped similarly under the same culture since they share 
language, religion and historiography (Laitin 1988; p. 591). 
Another important scholar, Putnam (1993), takes civic culture concept one step 
further in his work on culture to explain political conditions of Italy. 
4
 Putnam uses a 
composite measure of political culture to explain differences in civic engagement of 
different regions in Italy. According to Putnam, the current political situation is rooted 
in the civic culture of Italy that provides proof that the political culture measurement 
explains political actions.  
Political culture and political structure define each other in a closely related and 
harmonious way. Political structures can be seen as reflections of political culture but 
they also shape political culture (Pye, 1965). Political structures shape political patterns 
and political patterns form political preferences. Different set of values such as, 
“...patriotism, community loyalty, religious values, and simple habit and tradition 
obviously enter into the explanation of political structure and legitimacy” (Almond, 
1980, p. 184). Political structure and political culture relation is reciprocal in which 
political culture shape political structure and vice versa. 
The behavioral approach has been used to understand political behaviors and 
attitudes of individuals through survey methodology. The approach borrows from 
political psychology and uses individual level data. As individual values and beliefs 
change, the electoral results in a country change as well. Ideals, norms, beliefs, religion, 
symbols and customs shape value orientations and stand points of individuals and in a 
broader sense, societies have different value orientations that define their political 
culture. Orientations are shaped by socialization process and internalization of culture 
(Parsons, 1951). Value orientations are shaped by political culture and our cognitive 
knowledge about culture. Political culture is learned through socialization processes and 
                                                 
4
Social capital as a concept to explain current political situation of Italy. 
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shared norms, values and beliefs define political participation (Almond and Verba, 
1963). Value orientations differ from country to country that contributes to explain the 
increasing votes of extreme right parties in Europe. 
Party identification is highly related with the cultural values, religion and social 
class. Party preferences of individuals are shaped by cultural boundaries of that 
individual. In the past, people were more likely to vote according to their cultural 
standings, social classes and religious preferences which were more dominant in social 
and political life of people. In the last few decades, new issues started to gain votes such 
as; environmental protection, political participation, sex related issues and immigration 
issues and they are now on the agenda of new parties (Deegan, 2006, pp. 6-7). Post-
materialist issues are on the rise among Europe which is partly a result of the increase in 
vote shares of green parties and ERPs. Some countries witness significant increases in 
votes of extreme right parties, whereas some loss power of major parties. Extreme right 
parties mainly gain votes with their anti-immigrant standing and discourse. 
 
2.3. Operationalizing Political Culture 
Concept of the culture is hard to agree on since there are many differences 
between cultural practices of different countries and subcultures within those cultures. 
Shared values are not enough to understand political tendencies because people with 
opposing views can be under the same culture (Laitin, 1988, p.590). In this sense, 
individual level analysis is crucial to understand political attitudes but also applying 
individual behaviors to society level is necessary to be more comprehensive in making 
sense of general patterns in the culture of an existing country.  
Individuals exist within culture but also produce culture. In this sense, society 
level analysis is crucial because there are many subcultures that affect perceptions and 
above all there is a society level culture which also forms roots of general tendencies of 
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individuals that live under a given society. Culture is unconsciously internalized by 
people and it shapes our way of life, thinking, concepts, perceptions and behaviors in 
our social and political actions. 
Studying political culture as an independent variable gives researcher a more 
testable concept to understand the ambivalent individual choice of political action. 
Political culture can help us as an independent variable to explain the patterns of 
political behaviors to make sense of why people tend to shift their votes. It might be 
problematic to use political culture as an independent variable because it comes from 
the individual values which tend to change over the time but this is not a problem for 
this thesis because it aims to explain these changes and try to find their roots. Since 
basic values are not that unstable over time they can explain the revival of extreme right 
party votes. Survey data can help it to strengthen. 
In order to measure political culture materialist and post-materialist values such 
as; “cultural traditions and values; traditional values; religion, national pride, obedience 
and survival values; security, quality of life, self-expression, happiness, trust, tolerance, 
civic activism” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, p.52) become parameters in survey data 
analysis. Secular values, traditional values, political values, religious values all draw 
country profile and political culture. Certain values define certain countries more than 
others and give us an idea about political tendencies of these countries. In this context, 
there are many democracy and political culture studies which focus on values that affect 
democratic tendencies as discussed above. Extreme right party votes are also an issue to 
be elaborated through analyzing possible effects of different values of different 
countries.  
Religiosity with its possible effects is included in ERP studies (Ven der Brug et 
al. 2000; Arzhemier et al. 2009; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Werts et al. 2013). 
Religiosity is not included as a composite measure but rather different dimensions to 
find different effects on ERP voting (Arzheimer et al. 2009, p. 988). Arzheimer 
concludes that religiosity does not have a positive or negative effect on ERP voting but 
he remarks religious people as potential voters. Although religious people still are 
attached to their religious parties such as Christian Democratic and conservative parties, 
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those parties are losing their power and as a result due to their traditional and 
conservative value systems these people might become potential voters of ERP in the 
near future. 
Political culture is set of different values which are shared by individuals and 
draws the profile for countries and political preferences.  This research aims to measure 
values of religiosity, trust, civic culture, tolerance, political interest, national identity, 
and national pride to come up with an empirical measure of political culture concept 
and its relation to extreme right party voting. In other words, this thesis aims to test 
whether there is a pattern of certain values that affect extreme right party voting in 
Europe. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
This thesis adopts one of the quantitative research methods, details of which will 
be discussed in this chapter, since this study aims to study the concept of culture by 
testing individual behavior through the help of already existing quantitative data. 
Accordingly, survey analysis based research follows the studies of Almond&Verba 
1963, Inglehart 1997, Eckstein 1988 and Putnam1993 on political culture, which adopts 
quantitative techniques in answering their research questions. Confirming my approach, 
ERP studies usually follow the quantitative method tradition as cited in Arzheimer 
2009, Golder 2003, Lubbers et al. 2002, and Boomgarden&Vliegenhart 2007. 
This research aims to test the general political culture tendency through logistic 
analysis. Furthermore, the casual effects of different values as defined previously, are 
crucial to make sense out of individual cases (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994,p. 78). In 
order to prevent selection bias, all available European countries with extreme right wing 
votes are included in the research. Additionally, case study based research designs 
might test the effect of political culture further and deeper, since ‘culture’ as a concept 
by itself is very complex. While all cultures have their unique parameters this research 
aims to present a comparable and generalizable analysis of culture with its relevance in 
voting behavior literature. 
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3.1. Research Design of the Study 
This study evaluates the possible association between political culture and 
extreme right party voting behavior. While doing so, it also examines the possible 
effects of different values such as religiosity, trust, tolerance, obedience, civic 
engagement, national pride as well as happiness, life satisfaction. 
A number of studies in the literature used survey data to measure ‘political 
culture.’ As discussed previously, difficulty of such a research design comes from the 
ambiguity of the political culture concept and measuring the effects of culture on voting 
for the ERP. Studies focusing on the importance of political culture stem from the 
empirical methods in which survey questions are generally used to test different values 
and the effects of political culture. 
As this research aims to test the effects of political culture on voting behavior, 
individual level analysis emerge as crucial dimensions.  On the one hand, while 
individual behavior and values shape each individual’s socio-political identities and 
these values constitute the voting patterns of specific countries; on the other hand, 
individuals within shared cultures are more likely to have similar behavior compared to 
those with whom they do not share the same culture.  
To reduce the risk of partial explanations of the independent variables, control 
variables are needed to be introduced to test the casual link between the dependent and 
independent variables (Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000, pp. 50-51). With an aim to 
overcome this problem, this research adopts age, marital status, education, and gender 
as individual level control variables. 
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3.2. Data 
The European Social Survey (ESS) dataset is used in this research.
5
From the 
2000s, the surveys have been held every two years in European countries. There are six 
rounds of cross-national survey data starting from the first round of 2002 until 2012, as 
the latest round. The ESS received an ERIC status
6
 and it is funded by the European 
Science Foundation, European Commissions’ (EC) Framework programs, and national 
councils. The surveys have been designed to reach high standardized cross national 
data. Accordingly, the current methodology of the ESS surveys have been achieved by 
conducting steps such as pre-testing, sampling, data collection, reduction of bias, 
comparability among countries, and reliability. The project aims to cover changing 
values and attitudes over years under different themes across Europe.  
The ESS cross national survey, with its rich and variety of survey questions, 
allows researchers to identify and compare possible values and identities of individuals 
which create a tendency in voting for the ERPs. The dataset is very large and emerge as 
suitable to conduct analyses both at individual and country levels. Moreover, survey 
questions comply with the aim of this research, which is to measure value orientations 
of European citizens and measure political culture. 
Twenty European countries were selected according to availability and 
relevance of the data, considering 36 participant countries. Countries were chosen 
according to if they have participated at least in two rounds of the ESS. Furthermore, 
countries were chosen if the ERPs gained more than 0.5% of the votes in one of the 
rounds, because it has become necessary to see the tendency and relevance of the ERP 
voting with enough voters from each country (Previous studies also use logistic 
                                                 
5
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ 
6
 ERIC (European Research Infrastructure Consortium) status refers to European 
Research Infrastructure membership which is for joint research infrastructure 
establishment and it is under the legal framework of European Commission. 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/infrastructures/index_en.cfm?pg=eric 
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regression and 0.5 threshold for ERP vote shares to analyze the relevance of ERPs such 
as Lubbers et al., 2002, Werts et al., 2013). With the help of previous studies 
(Arzheimer, 2006, pp. 425-426, Golder, 2003, p. 448, and Werts et al. 2013, p. 191) and 
the analysis of party programs helped me in this study to create a list of the ERPs in 
Europe. Table 1
i
presents the complete list of extreme right parties from twenty selected 
European countries with their average ERP vote shares in the six ESS rounds. 16 
countries were excluded from the research, because either they did not have enough 
votes of ERPs, or they did not participate at least two rounds of surveys. 
 
Table 1: Detailed list of extreme right parties 
 
Austria 
 FPÖ: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria), BZÖ: 
Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria) 
Belgium 
VB: Vlaams Blok (Flemish Interest), FN: Front National (National 
Front) 
Bulgaria 
Ataka (Attack), NFSB: Natzionalen Front za Spasenie na Bulgaria 
(National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria) 
Croatia HSP: Hrvatska stranka prava (Croatian Pure Party of Rights) 
Denmark 
FRPd: Fremskridtspartiet (Progress Party), DFP: Dansk Folkeparty 
(Danish People’s Party) 
Finland PS: Perussuomalaiset (Finn’s Party-True Finns) 
France 
FN: Front National (National Front), MNR: Mouvement National 
Républicain (National Republican Movement) 
Germany 
REP: Republikaner (the Republicans), NPD/DVU: 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party 
of Germany) / Deutsche Volksunion (The People’s Union). 
Greece 
LAOS: Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós (Popular Orthodox Rally), 
Chrysí Avgí (Golden Dawn). 
Hungary MIEP/Jobbik: Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (the Movement for a 
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Better Hungary). 
Italy 
LN: Lega Nord, MS-Ft : Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore 
(Tricolour Flame Social Movement) 
Netherlands 
 LPF: Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List), PVV: Partij Voor de 
Vrijheid (Party For Freedom). 
Norway FRPn: Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party) 
Poland 
LPR: Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families), KNP: Kongres 
Nowej Prawicy (Congress of the New Right) 
Portugal 
PNR: Partido Nacional Renovador (National Renovator Party), CDS/PP: 
Centro Democrático Social/ Partido Popular (People's Party) 
Slovakia SNS: Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party) 
Slovenia SNS: Slovenska nacionalna stranka (Slovenian National Party) 
Sweden SD: Sverigedemokratema (Sweden Democrats) 
Switzerland 
SVP/UDC: Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party), SD: 
Schweizer Demokraten (Swiss Democrats),EDU/UDF: Eidgenössisch-
Demokratische Union (Federal Democratic Union), FPS/PSL: Freiheits-
Partei der Schweiz (Freedom Party of Switzerland), TL: Lega dei 
Ticinesi (Ticino League), PNOS/PNS: Partei National Orientierter 
Schweizer (Swiss Nationalist Party), MCG: Mouvement Citoyens 
Genevois (Geneva Citizen’s Movement). 
Turkey 
MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party), BBP: 
Büyük Birlik Partisi (Great Union Party) 
 
This study also benefitted from an alternative data source, Eurostat 
7
. Eurostat is 
the European Commission’s statistical database that provides standardized, reliable, and 
objective data at the European level. In the Eurostat database, many types of data, which 
are derived from European countries, are offered for various types of analysis. The 
                                                 
7
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ 
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observations for unemployment rate, asylum seekers, immigration rate, and energy 
consumption variables were taken from Eurostat database in this research. 
In accordance with my preference, Werts et al. (2013, 194), who focused on the 
effects of Euroscepticism in explaining the increasing vote share of the ERPs in Europe, 
also appear to use the same data source of ESS for his analysis. Following the previous 
study, I add individual background characteristics, socio-political attitudes, and 
contextual characteristics to this research to contribute Werts et al. (2013)’s previous 
study and I came across with to understand the effect political culture on extreme right-
wing voting. 
3.3. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is extreme right voting behavior and it is based on the 
answer of the party preferences question in the ESS. This question asks the ‘party voted 
for in last election’ in each six rounds. The answer of this question, the variable was 
recoded according to the two categories: ‘voting for other parties’ and ‘voting for 
ERPs’. A binary variable was created and recoded as “0” if individual voted for other 
parties and recoded as “1” if individual voted for ERPs. People, who did not vote, do 
not remember which party they voted or did not state their party preferences were 
excluded from the analysis. Twenty participant countries were included in the 
dependent variable measurement that met the condition of (1) sufficient extreme right 
party vote share and (2) sufficient data from the ESS for analysis.
ii
 Table2 presents the 
list of extreme right parties of the twenty countries with their proportion of received 
votes in ESS database and average national election results that are derived from NSD 
European Election Database. Comparatively, ESS survey vote proportions are lower 
than actual national elections results for analyzed countries since survey participation is 
based on voluntary answers.  
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Table 2: Extreme right parties and proportion of votes among European countries 
 
Countries Extreme Right Party 
Average votes 
in ESS (%) 
Average votes in 
national 
elections (%) 
Austria FPÖ, BZÖ 6.71 8.39 
Belgium VB, FN 6.34 11.68 
Bulgaria Ataka 3.62 9.36 
Croatia HSP, HNO 1.66 3.29 
Denmark FRDd, DFP 8 13.22 
Finland PS 3.5 5.15 
France FN, MNR 4.9 8.25 
Germany Republikaner, NPD/DVU 0.65 1.81 
Greece LAOS, Golden Dawn 1.66 5.37 
Hungary MIEP, Jobbik 2.25 5.81 
Italy LN, MsFt 1.34 7.50 
Netherlands LPF, PVV 7.28 8.82 
Norway FRPn 14.22 19.87 
Poland LPR 2.36 4.22 
Portugal PNR, CDS/PP 2.26 9.27 
Slovakia SNS 4.44 6.18 
Slovenia SNS 3.3 4.46 
Sweden SD 0.54 5.70 
Switzerland SVP, SD, EDU, FPS, TL, MCG, SN 15.75 29.23 
Turkey MHP, BBP 5.63 11.83 
Source: European Social Survey, NSD European Election Database (2002-2012)
8
 
 
                                                 
8
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/ 
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3.4. Independent Variables 
3.4.1. Marital Status 
To see the effect of being single or married, the effect of marital status is 
included as part of individual’s background/characteristic. In the first two rounds there 
were five categories as the answer of the question related to marital status, which are as 
follows: “married,” “separated,” “divorced,” “widowed,” and “never married.” To 
follow Werts et al. (2013)’s data formulation, I recoded them into four categories as 
“married,” “divorced/separated,” “widowed,” and “never married.” In the third and 
fourth waves categories were raised to nine as; “married,” “in a civil partnership,” 
“separated (still legally married),” “separated(still in a civil partnership),” “divorced,” 
“widowed,” “formerly in civil partnership, now dissolved,” “formerly in civil 
partnership, partner died,” and “never married and never in civil partnership.” These 
categories again recoded to comply with the first four categories. The first category was 
created from “married” and “in a civil partnership” categories. The two distinct 
categories of being “separated” and “divorced“ were recoded into “divorced/separated” 
category, “widowed” category was formed by the sixth, seventh, and eighth categories. 
Last category remained the same and “refusal”, “no answer” and “don’t know” answers 
were excluded from the analysis. In the last two rounds, six new categories recoded into 
four categories as; “Legally married” and “In a legally registered civil union” into a 
“married,”  “Legally separated” and “Legally divorced/civil union dissolved” categories 
were recoded as “divorced/separated”, “Widowed/civil partner died” remained as 
“widowed” and  “None of these” remained as “never married.”. Following the 
replication of Werts et al. (2012)’s analysis, married people were taken as a reference 
category and other categories were taken apart to measure the effect of singles by these 
categories.  
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3.4.2. Perceived Deprivation 
This category is Werts et al. (2012)’s individual level variable and it measures 
the effect of “feeling about source of household’s income nowadays.” Respondents 
categorized their feelings according to the answers: “living comfortably on present 
income,” “coping on present income,” ‘’finding it difficult on present income,” and 
“finding it very difficult on present income.” 
3.4.3. Education Level 
The ESS data used the ISCED coding frame consisting of five categories to 
measure the highest level of education among European countries. This coding frame 
allows the standardization of different education levels and types of different countries. 
In our analysis, the ISCED coding frame was followed and categories were created such 
as “less than lower secondary,” “lower secondary,” “upper secondary,” “advanced 
vocational, sub-degree,” and “tertiary education.” 
3.4.4. Control Variables 
Furthermore, age and gender measures were included in the study as control 
variables at individual level. Age was calculated with the help of the ESS dataset for 
each country and accordingly this variable was included in the analysis.  
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3.4.5. Contextual Variables 
Contextual variables that are used by Werts et al. (2012) were also included in 
the analysis. Unemployment rates, immigration rate, asylum seekers application, and 
energy intensity were derived from the Eurostat. Data were organized parallel to the 
conduct years of the six ESS rounds for each country. Change in immigration rate and 
unemployment rates were calculated as the difference of the rates between ESS round 
year and the year before.  
The number of asylum seeker applications was also derived from the Eurostat. 
Additionally, the annual data of asylum applications was used in the analysis. Energy 
intensity data was computed by gross inland consumption of energy that is divided by 
GDP of countries. Energy intensity of the economy was used for modernization proxy 
for included countries (Werts et al., 2013).  
 
3.4.6. Socio-Political Attitudes 
This section explains the variables that are the measurements of the research of 
Werts et al. (2013) and the variables included in this thesis in order not to undermine 
previously used ESS data analysis on extreme right voting. Accordingly, ethnic threat, 
subjective victimization, law and order, social isolation, attachment to traditions, 
political distrust, and euroscepticism were tested.  
Ethnic threat that is caused by immigrants according to respondents were 
calculated by two distinct questions from the ESS surveys. Response of people on 
answers such as “country’s cultural life is enriched by immigrants” and “country’s 
economic life is enriched by immigrants” were taken into consideration and a scale was 
constructed through factor analysis and included in my logistic regression model.  
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This subjective crime perception is a measurement of the question of whether 
“feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark,” which respondents scaled 
their feelings from “very safe,” “safe,” and “unsafe” to “very unsafe”. 
Law and order scale was used as a proxy for authoritarianism. Three questions 
were included in this scale through factor analysis to measure the effect of the 
authoritarianism. Respondents answered “important to behave properly,” “important 
that government is strong and ensures safety,” and “important to do what is told and 
follow rules” questions with answers such as “very much like me” to “not like me at 
all.” This 1 to 6 scored scale was recoded as follows: “not like me at all” as 1 to “very 
much like me” as 6. This is due to the way of measurement of the effect of 
authoritarianism, e.g. “very much like me” answers would mean high support for law 
and order.  
Furthermore, attachment to traditions was also tested. With the same scale of 1 
to 6 people chose their attachment to traditions by answering the related question with 
the answer: “important to follow traditions and customs.” This scale was also recoded 
and reversed. New scale is coded from “not like me at all” to “very much like me” to 
test the possible traditionalist effect on extreme right wing voting. 
Another scale, political distrust scale was used to test political trust level. This 
scale included three different measurements; “trust in politicians,” “trust in country’s 
parliament,” and “how satisfies with the national government.”  Three questions had 0 
to 10 scales for the respondents including answers changing from “not trust at all” to 
“complete trust” and for the last question the answers on the scale also varied from 
“extremely dissatisfied” to “extremely satisfied.” This scale was reversed since the 
effect of distrust aimed to be computed and the new scale went from “complete trust” to 
“not trust at all” and “extremely satisfied” to “extremely dissatisfied.” Factor analysis 
was used to compute the effect of these three variables on political distrust scale.  
The social isolation was measured according to the responds of individuals to 
the question of how often they meet with their friends, relatives and colleagues. On the 
scale of 1 to 7 respondents choose “never” to “everyday” to state their social situation. 
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This variable was also recoded from “everyday” to “never,” because it is expected that 
if people are less social they are more expected to vote extreme right parties. 
The effect of euroscepticism was the main concern of the research of Werts et al. 
(2012). This thesis includes euroscepticism, which is measured with a set of the survey 
questions of the ESS data. Respondents were asked about their “trust in the European 
Parliament” and answers were scaled from “not trust at all” to “complete trust.” These 
codes of 0 to 10 were reversed to be able to measure the effect of distrust level. As a 
result scale now became “complete trust” to “not trust at all”.    
3.4.7. Political Culture Variables 
3.4.7.1. Religiosity 
 To test the effect of religion on extreme right voting, church attendance 
parameter was included in the analysis following the previous works in literature such 
as Werts et al. (2013) and Scheepers et al. (2002). People were asked how often they 
attend religious services apart from special occasions. Answers on the scale varied from 
“everyday” to “never” and this was reversed and recoded in this study from “never” to 
“every day.” The possible effect of church attendance is that if people attend church 
more, then they are more likely to vote for the ERPs.  
Secondly, to see the possible effect of praying was also included. Religious 
practice was tested by the question of “how often people pray apart from at religious 
services.” This variable was also recoded from “never” to “everyday” to test whether 
people are more likely to vote for ERPs if they pray more. Lastly, the religiosity 
variable was computed by the religiosity level of people. Respondents scaled 
themselves from “not at all religious” to “very religious” on a 0 to 10 scale.  
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3.4.7.2. Trust Level 
Political distrust was also included in my analysis. To develop trust level 
analysis, I added three separate social trust parameters to the model. First, people were 
asked if they find “most people trusted or you can’t be too careful” and respondents 
scaled their opinions from “they can’t be too careful” to “most people can be trusted.” 
Secondly, the respondents were asked if they think “most people try to take advantage 
of them, or try to be fair” and they scaled themselves from “most people try to take 
advantage of them” to “most people try to be fair.” Third parameter was measuring if 
people mostly look out for themselves or people mostly try to be helpful. Answers were 
scaled from 0 to 10 and scale was reversely recoded for all three parameters, because 
this research expects people to be more likely to vote for the ERPs if people are socially 
distrustful. 
Tolerance level was analyzed through three separate parameters. To measure 
whether people are tolerant or not, I choose to include the effect of tolerance to 
immigrants or gay and lesbian people. In the first place tolerance to gays and lesbians 
was computed by asking respondents if they see “gays and lesbians free to live life as 
they wish.”   
Other two parameters were included to test tolerance to immigrants. 
Respondents were asked about their preferences to “allow many/few immigrants of 
different race/ethnic group from majority” and “allow many/few immigrants from 
poorer countries outside Europe.” Answers were scaled from 1 to 4 as people positioned 
themselves in one of the choices of “allow them to come and live here,” “allow some,” 
“allow few,” and “allow none.” 
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3.4.7.3. Civic Engagement 
The measurement of civic engagement was analyzed by several political 
participation questions that are asked to people if “they are member of a trade union or 
similar organization,” “they contacted politician or government official last 12 months,” 
“they worked in political party or action group last 12 months,” “they worked in another 
organization or association last 12 months,” “they wore or displayed campaign 
badge/sticker last 12 months,” “they take part in lawful public demonstration last 12 
months,” and “they signed petition last 12 months.”. These questions were ‘’yes’’ and 
‘’no’’ questions and their answers were recoded as 1 if the answer is ‘’yes’’ and as 0 if 
the answer is “no’’ to analyze the effect of political interest on extreme right voting. 
3.4.7.4. National Pride 
People were asked about their “satisfaction with the national government” to 
measure national pride. The question was answered through 10 levels ranging from 0 to 
10 which wasordered from “extremely dissatisfied” to “extremely satisfied.” 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. The Basic Model 
In order to test the effect of political culture on extreme right wing voting, logistic 
regression is used to test the two models. First model is the replication of research of 
Werts et al. (2013) in which he measured the effect of different parameters on extreme 
right wing voting in Europe by using the same data source (ESS). I included his 
parameters not to undermine his findings but contribute his analysis with the effect of 
political culture. First model is inclusion of variables that he used in his research.  
Logistic regression is preferred because of the binary dependent variable. Dependent 
variable enables the research to differentiate extreme right party voting from voting for 
other parties. The dichotomous variable is coded as 0 if people voted for other than 
extreme right parties and as 1 if they voted for ERPS.  
The results of logistic regression are represented in the table 3 for the first model. 
Analysis are conducted from N= 69,045 respondents from 20 countries and six years of 
survey. Firstly, results indicate that men, divorced/separated and young people are more 
likely to vote for ERPs. Ethnic threat, political distrust and behavior have an effect on 
extreme right voting. People, who are Eurosceptic, have a perception of ethnic threat 
and political distrust are more likely to vote for extreme right wing. Perceived 
deprivation, unemployment, change in unemployment, immigration rate, change in 
immigration, asylum seekers, energy consumption which is a proxy for modernization 
seem to have a negative effect on ERP voting. Furthermore, law and order, subjective 
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victimization are not statistically significant. Surprisingly people with traditional 
attachments are not significant in the model and socially isolated people are not likely to 
vote for ERPs.  
 
Table 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Extreme Right Party Voting (Model 1) 
 
  Model 1 
Gender (male = 1) 0.487 
 
(12.57)** 
Age -0.006 
 
(4.00)** 
Education -0.079 
 
(4.78)** 
Percieved deprivation -0.105 
 
(4.14)** 
Marital status 
 
Married (ref) - 
Divorced/Seperated 0.327 
 
(5.56)** 
Widowed -0.134 
 
-1.67 
Never married -0.032 
 
-0.63 
Contextual Characteristics 
 
Unemployment -0.056 
 
(6.68)** 
Δunemployment -0.098 
 
(4.62)** 
Immigration rate -0.004 
 
(24.37)** 
Δunemployment 0 
 
(3.48)** 
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Asylum seekers -0.001 
 
(7.24)** 
Energy consumption (/100) -0.003 
 
(8.58)** 
Ethnic threat 0.612 
 
(29.10)** 
Subjective victimization 0.017 
 
(-0.67) 
Law and order 0.038 
 
-1.85 
Social Isolation -0.036 
 
(2.87)** 
Attachment to traditions -0.006 
 
-0.41 
Political distrust 0.086 
 
(3.40)** 
Euroscepticism 0.084 
  (8.61)** 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
4.2. Final Model 
In this model the effect of political culture on extreme right party voting is tested 
through different parameters such as religiosity, trust, tolerance, civic engagement and 
life satisfaction.  
Religiosity is tested by three parameters. As a result religious people (B: 0.021) 
are more likely to vote for ERPs but on the other hand people who go to church (-0.161) 
are less likely to vote for ERPs. Praying parameter is statistically not significant for this 
research. 
Trust analysis is focused on measuring distrust in people’s actions (B:-0.03). As 
a result people, who “think people are more looking out for themselves”, are more 
likely to vote for ERPs. Furthermore, other parameters of social trust are not statistically 
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significant in the model. Further research should be done in social trust parameter to 
come up with a possible effect with a different model and parameters. 
To measure tolerance level parameters about immigration tolerance and 
gay/lesbian tolerance are tested in the model. Intolerance to gay and lesbians is 
statistically not significant. Not surprisingly, people who are intolerant to immigrants 
who does not share same ethnicity and race (B: 0.187) with the respondents and 
immigrants from poorer parts of Europe (B: 0.278) are more likely to vote for ERPs. 
Furthermore, people who thinks immigrants share same ethnicity and race (B: -0.119) 
are not welcome to the country are less likely to vote for ERPs. In this sense we can 
conclude that intolerance to immigrants leads to increase in extreme right wing voting.  
Civic engagement is measured by variables of political participation. 
Surprisingly, civic engagement is an effective value for the extreme right party vote 
preferences. People who contacted with politician or official government (B: 0.141) and 
signed petition (B: 0.333) are more likely to vote for ERPs. Furthermore, boycott 
participation (B: 0.169) and membership of a trade union (B: 0.303) positively affected 
the extreme right party voting. Only, demonstration participation (B: -0.273) above 
them have a negative effect on extreme right party voting. In sum, extreme right parties 
gain more votes from people who have political participation. 
Lastly, life satisfaction, national pride and happiness do not have an effect on 
extreme right party voting according to this analysis. Further analysis with different 
possible interactions and variables should be conducted to analyze the possible effect of 
these parameters. 
Table 4: Logistic Regression Analysis of Extreme Right Party Voting 
(Model1&Model2) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Gender (male = 1) 0.487 0.462 
 
(12.57)** (9.36)** 
Age -0.006 -0.008 
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(4.00)** (4.32)** 
Education -0.079 -0.112 
 
(4.78)** (5.21)** 
Percieved deprivation -0.105 -0.105 
 
(4.14)** (3.15)** 
Marital status 
  
Married (ref) - - 
Divorced/Seperated 0.327 0.323 
 
(5.56)** (4.50)** 
Widowed -0.134 -0.055 
 
(-1.67) (-0.56) 
Never married -0.032 -0.045 
 
(-0.63) (-0.7) 
Contextual Characteristics 
  
Unemployment -0.056 -0.047 
 
(6.68)** (3.89)** 
ΔUnemployment -0.098 -0.123 
 
(4.62)** (4.81)** 
Immigration rate -0.004 -0.004 
 
(24.37)** (18.92)** 
ΔImmigration 0 0 
 
(3.48)** (2.18)* 
Asylum seekers -0.001 -0.001 
 
(7.24)** (3.59)** 
Energy consumption (/100) -0.003 -0.001 
 
(8.58)** (2.85)** 
Ethnic threat 0.612 0.49 
 
(29.10)** (16.02)** 
Subjective victimization 0.017 0.002 
 
(-0.67) (-0.07) 
Law and order 0.038 0.009 
 
(-1.85) (-0.34) 
Social Isolation -0.036 -0.041 
 
(2.87)** (2.60)** 
 37 
 
Attachment to traditions -0.006 0.028 
 
-0.41 -1.5 
Political distrust 0.086 0.111 
 
(3.40)** (2.20)* 
Euroscepticism 0.084 0.097 
 
(8.61)** (7.89)** 
Religiosity level 
  
Religiosity  
 
0.021 
  
(1.98)* 
Religious practice 
 
-0.029 
  
(-1.78) 
Church attendance 
 
-0.161 
  
(6.96)** 
Trust level 
  
Social distrust in people 
 
0 
  
(-0.02) 
Social distrust in people's 
intentions  
-0.016 
  
(-1.23) 
Social distrust in people's 
selfishness  
-0.03 
  
(2.55)* 
Tolerance level 
  
Intolerance to gay and lesbians 
 
0.027 
  
(-1.24) 
Intolerance to immigrants with 
same ethnicity and race  
-0.119 
  
(3.48)** 
Intolerance to immigrants with 
different race and ethnicity  
0.187 
  
(4.03)** 
Intolerance to immigrants from 
poorer countries  
0.278 
  
(6.69)** 
 38 
 
Civic Engagement 
  
Contact with politician or 
government official  
0.141 
  
(2.27)* 
Signed petition 
 
0.333 
  
(5.96)** 
Demonstration participation 
 
-0.273 
  
(2.49)* 
Boycott participation 
 
0.169 
  
(2.73)** 
Membership of trade union 
 
0.303 
  
(6.01)** 
National pride 
 
0.02 
  
(-1.21) 
Life dissatisfaction 
 
-0.017 
  
(-1.14) 
Unhappiness 
 
-0.033 
  
(-1.92) 
_cons -1.397 -2.525 
 
(9.20)** (11.49)** 
N 69,045 49,825 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
4.3. Analysis 
The effect of political culture with its’ different levels is tested through two 
models with logistic regression analysis. Different values of people are expected to have 
different outcomes for extreme right party voting. As a result, results of this research is 
appropriate to previous work of Werts et al (2012) in terms of the effect of perceived 
deprivation, ethnic threat, political distrust, Euroscepticism. However, this research did 
not find significant effect of attachment to traditions that was differently found in 
research of Werts et al. (2012). In this manner, possible reasons for change can be the 
last two years of surveys and included different countries such as, Croatia, Finland, 
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Portugal and Sweden. In Werts’ research energy consumption is not found significant 
but in this research this modernization proxy has a negative effect (B: -0.003) on ERP 
voting. In other words high modernity levels mean fewer votes for ERPs. 
Contrary to findings of (Arzheimer, 2009), religiosity has an effect on extreme 
right voting behavior. Following the previous literature, it is found that religious people 
are more likely to vote for ERPs (Werts et al., 2013). Yet, the results show that people 
who attend to church are less likely to vote for ERPs. In his final model Werts (2013), 
the results of religiosity is statistically not significant and church attendance has a 
negative effect. In his research social disintegration theory (Werts et al. 2013, pp. 186-
187, Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007) is used to explain this relation. According to this 
theory, if people belong to certain group they tend to follow their norms and values. In 
this sense, people who go to church belong to certain community and follow their norms 
and values which effect to their voting preferences. Contrary to previous study of Werts, 
religiosity has an effect on ERP voting. On the one hand, people are attached to their 
church community and more likely to vote for conservative, center right parties. On the 
other hand, people regard themselves as religious are likely to vote for ERPs. 
Furthermore, this theory implies that socially isolated people or people with fewer 
attachments to community or social group are more likely to vote for extreme right 
wing. In his analysis, results show that religiosity and social isolations are not 
significant parameters for ERP voting but church attendance has a negative. According 
to final model, social and religious people are more likely to vote for ERPs. In here we 
can conclude that social disintegration theory does not sufficient to explain extreme 
right wing voting.   
Civic engagement or activism has a positive impact on increasing votes of ERPs. 
People who are participant of boycotts, signed petition, member of trade unions and 
contacted with the politician or government official are more likely to vote for ERPs. 
However, people who are participated demonstrations are less likely to vote. On the one 
hand, it is likely that extreme people to be more participant in politics and this overlaps 
with the results. People who vote for ERPs can be more active and involved in political 
life to express their needs more than majority. This reciprocal process shows that value 
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orientations shape voting behavior but at the same time voting preferences shape value 
orientations. On the other hand, demonstration participation results do not suit with the 
expectations and other parameters of civic engagement. Further research can be 
conducted to see in which ways demonstration participation can be differentiated from 
other civic engagement actions.  
According to the results, social trust does not have an impact on ERP voting. 
When respondents are directly asked about their trust to people statistically significant 
relation with ERP voting was not found. Only, people who think people are looking out 
for themselves vote more for ERPs. This finding is suitable to my expectations because 
people, who have a negative perspective about helping others and expecting help from 
others, tend to be more individualistic and more likely to become more extreme in party 
preferences. Furthermore, political distrust means higher votes for ERPs. In sum, people 
who have distrust in political manners and believe people are looking out for 
themselves, are more likely to vote for ERPs.      
Tolerance towards “others” is a very crucial issue in extreme right wing 
literature. As it is expected, people with high level of distrust tend to vote for ERPs 
more than other parties. Especially intolerance to immigrants leads an increase in votes 
of ERPs. ERPs have an anti-immigrant stand point of view and anti-immigration or 
intolerance to immigrants go hand in hand. When we look at the results, important 
differentiation has been done by people about intolerance to immigrants. Citizens tend 
to welcome immigrants that belong to their own ethnicity and race from majority but 
they are very intolerant to immigrants from other ethnic and race groups and from 
poorer parts of Europe.  People are more likely to accept people to their in-group if they 
share same ethnicity and race.   
Due to nature of extreme right parties are more likely to get votes from people 
who are less tolerant and have less trust to immigrants or “others”.  Discrimination, 
xenophobia hostility feelings are attached with the ERP nature which explains the 
intolerant and less mistrustful people identify themselves with these parties. In addition 
to this, people tend to discriminate immigrants that are outside of their own group as 
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Coenders (2011) points out; there is a hostility tendency towards out groups which is 
also supported by the results. This hostility is identified with people who are intolerant 
to out-group immigrants. People tend to welcome and accept immigrants belong to their 
in-group in which they share ethnicity and race.  
Other important values national pride, law and order or obedience, social trust 
and happiness do not have significant effects on ERP voting and these values are 
expected to be elaborated furthermore in the future. Different proxies and measurements 
can be introduced by different models and different data for further testing.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis provided a cultural explanation to extreme right party voting by 
including value parameters to the literature. The analysis included a set of different 
values that are affecting voting preferences of people in choosing ERPs. Values of 
religiosity level, distrust, intolerance, civic engagement or activism, law and order or 
obedience, national pride and happiness are tested. These set of values shape socio-
political identities of people and their voting behaviors.   
However, traditional values are expected to lose power in effecting voting 
preferences the role of religion as continues to shape determining who to vote in 
Europe. On the one hand, religious people are more likely to vote for ERPs whereas 
people who attend to church are not voting for extreme right parties. Church attendance 
mean community based religious practice and unique socialization process and this 
socialization might effect to party preferences. Community groups are likely to vote for 
closer groups to themselves due to their community belongings and this does not 
necessarily mean that religious people are not voting for ERPs. On the other hand 
national pride, as a proxy for nationalism does not have an effect on ERP voting 
behavior. In this sense effect of nationalism can be elaborated through different proxy 
parameter and it should be further analyzed. 
While these findings imply that anti-immigrant discourse and hostility towards 
“others” go hand in hand with preferences of ERPs. Intolerant, religious and politically 
participant but distrustful people are expectedly more voting for extreme right parties. 
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These voters adopted mentioned values to their socio-political identities through their 
socialization processes. Extreme right parties with their xenophobic, anti-immigrant and 
ultranationalist stand points are suitable for these people who has hostility towards 
“others” and “outsiders”.  
Trust level is also another important value orientation of voters to be identified. 
The results indicate that political distrust is an explanation for extreme right wing 
voting. When people are uncomfortable with existing politics and political structures 
they tend to search options other than main stream parties. ERPs are attracting people 
with their new and passionate discourse if there is distrust to parties of majority. 
With this research, we can strongly conclude that intolerance to immigrants and 
ethnic minorities is an important indicator for extreme right voting. Less educated, 
young people, divorced/separated, men, religious, intolerant people and people who are 
happy with their income, distrustful to politics, have higher level of civic activism are 
background values for extreme right wing voting. Political culture with its complex and 
rich context is shaping values of people and people with different set of values prefer to 
vote for ERPs. Although there are some unexpected results in our model, according to 
this research certain values do have an effect on voting preferences. To test other 
possible effects and parameters of political culture further research is necessary since 
there is not much analysis on political culture and its effects on extreme right wing 
voting. 
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i
 Countries that are excluded from the research are Czech Republic, Britain, Spain, 
Iceland, Luxembourg, Albania, Cyprus, Israel, Russia, Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Kosovo and Ukraine. Ireland, Iceland, Estonia, Czech Republic, 
Britain, Spain, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia are rmoved from the analysis because they 
did not have enough votes for ERPs at least in two rounds. Kosovo, Albania, 
Luxembourg are excluded because they did not participated at least two rounds. Russian 
Federation, Israel and Cyprus dropped due to geographical reasons. For the case of 
Ukraine, there are party blocs in the elections and Svoboda joins to The Union for 
Ukraine “Fatherland”. Although extreme right party Svoboda is part of this bloc, 
Ukraine was not included because the bloc is not defined as extreme right and its 
features should be analyzed further before including the country. 
 
 
 
